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The policy that evolved not only treated the South and North as separate entities, but the language, religion, and economics as well as politics stemmed from different experiences and practices. A rudimentary Christian orientation developed in the South, using the English language as the mode of communication.
While links with the Arab world were primarily through Arab slavers, a corrupt bureaucracy, and the army, associations with Europe evolved through Christian missionaries and British administrators--who it might be added were not inclined to favor close ties with the Moslem North.
In addition to perpetuating a separateness, there developed distrust and suspicion between Northerner and Southerner.
While the North viewed the South as a forbidding land inhabited by savages, the Southerners viewed the Northerner as an Arab slaver and exploiter intent on complete subjugation of the South into an Islamic State.
The effect of the Mahdi revolt was to perpetuate these attitudes.
The Mahdi did, however, create a temporary unity against Egyptian rule, but this quickly disappeared into a North-South separateness.
Indeed existing institutions in the South were destroyed with little to fill the vacuum except the threat of Mahdi raiders.
...one must regard the Mahdi's invasions as extended raids which upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and left nothing behind but anarchy and fear.... Strong enough to defeat the Negroids but never sufficiently strong to establish their hegemony over them, the Mahdis were compelled to raid again and again not only to maintain their position but also to secure even the most essential supplies. And the only lasting result of these continual raidswas the Southerner's hatred and fear of the Northern Sudanese (Collin 1962, pp. 11-12).
The South was left with a tribal system that had been completely disrupted by alien administrators, traders, missionaries, and finally Mahdi invaders.
THE CONDOIINIUM AND SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT In 1902, following the defeat of the Mahdi and the reconquest of the Sudan by Egyptian-British
forces, the government decided to treat the six Northern provinces of the Sudan and the three Southern provinces as separate problems, albeit only temporary.
Although the Condominium relationship rested on a dual control of the Sudan, for all practical purposes it was the British that ruled.
The British, viewing the South as an untamed frontier, were primarily concerned with establishing some semblance of law and order as the first priority.
Consequently, pacification and "care and maintenance" became the basis for British policy during these initial years--it might be added that this remained generally the case until World War II (Collin 1962, p. 62; see also Report....
1956, p. 87).
The cultural differences between the regions were fundamental to the British view that the Southern three provinces were distinct and separate from the North and were part of Black Africa.
As Genera ly, there were four phases in the military operations of the Anya Nya.
The first was the organizational period which started from the 1955 mutiny and extended through 1963, when a number of separate and variously organized bands were loosely organized into the Anya Nya. The second phase was the "Simba" revolt period of the Congo, when the Anya Nya was able to gather a number of modern weapons from a spillover of the Congo rebellion.
Ironically, the Sudan government assisted the Congolese rebels, but in so doing also provided an opportunity for the Anya Nya to gain access to a reasonable assortment of modern weapons. 6Anya Nya forces were estimated to be 5,000 although estimates vary from a few hundred to over 10,000.
Sudanese government forces numbered about 17,000.
Generally, Anya Nya forces were divided geographically, each unit operating within a particular locality with little coordination with other units. In capsule form, the military government, searching for solutions to the Southern problem, invited public debate and participation.
Students at the University of Khartoum accepted the invitation, which ultimately led to student demonstrations. The response of the government resulted in a student death and the closing of the University.
The repressive measures of the government against the students precipitated a general strike in Khartoum which finally led to the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the key governing body of the military. This was followed by the reinstitution of parliamentary government under the new prime minister, Mr. Khalifa.
In an effort to reach some kind of solution to the Southern problem, the new prime minister announced an unconditional amnesty for all Southern Sudanese who had fled since 1955 and appealed to exiles to return home to work for freedom and equality in the Sudan (Africa Independent 1972, p. 82).
The Sudan African National Union, in rejecting the offer, noted the lack of substantive political reforms and again demanded complete independence for the South.
Nevertheless, the Khartoum government continued its efforts. This led to a round table conference in Juba in 1965, but only after two postponements due to disagreements as to sites and agenda. Meanwhile another resistance movement, the Southern 7For an interesting insight into the nature of the war, see Reed 1972. The discussion by Reed seems to represent a microcosm of the war in all of the Southern provinces.
Front, emerged and with it a degree of militancy which did much to perpetuate Southern disunity at the conference.
To compound the Southern unity problem, the Anya Nya continued its military operations despite pleas for a cessation during the period of the conference.
Although there was some hope that the conference could bring the rebellion to an end, little of substantive value was achieved. While the Southerners demanded independence, the Northerners were ready to concede anything but independence.
Moreover, while the Northerners presented a unified front, the Southern delegation was wracked with disagreement. To be sure, the Northerners were sincere in their desire for political accord, but they became increasingly concerned with the exercise of political power in the North after years of military government: in their eyes the Southern problem became secondary.
If the conference did not accomplish its immediate objectives, it did identify the issues and clarify them for both Northerners and Southerners.
In this respect, it provided an opportunity for leaders and public in both regions to get a firsthand view of the problems. Another factor which created an environment conducive to political settlement was the minimum concern with international issues. Although the Sudanese Army did have access to Soviet and Egyptian modern arms, the military struggle, in the main, was confined primarily to the conflict between the Sudanese Armnny and the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. As such, the issues were confined to the immediate interests within the borders of the Sudan and were not escalated to issues of an international or even regional nature.
One of the intangible factorswas the growth of a Southern Sudanese nationalism.
Where historically there had been antagonisms between Southerners, the common Northern enemy tended to subdue these traditional antagonisms for the sake of a unity and the growth of a Southern "togetherness." Whether this will be sufficient to build a cohesive Southern effort for economic modernization and political power within the Sudanese state is another matter.
Nevertheless, the recognition of an emerging Southern unity combined with the ineffectiveness of the Northern counterrevolutionary operations undoubtedly added to the increasing futility with which the struggle was viewed by the North. One major step towards integration is institution-building--institutions that provide meaningful channels for the various groups to express their grievances with some expectation for rectification. In the long history of antagonisms between North and South, it was the British administrator more than any institution that was receptive to Southern attitudes and opinions. This is hardly a condition that fosters institution-building.
